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In hedonic games, players form coalitions based on individual preferences over
the group of players they belong to. Several concepts to describe the stability of
coalition structures in a game have been proposed and analyzed. However, prior
research focuses on algorithms with time complexity that is at least linear in the
input size. In the light of very large games that arise from, e.g., social networks and
advertising, we initiate the study of sublinear time property testing algorithms for
existence and verification problems under several notions of coalition stability in
a model of hedonic games represented by graphs with bounded degree. In graph
property testing, one shall decide whether a given input has a property (e.g., a game
admits a stable coalition structure) or is far from it, i.e., one has to modify at least
an ǫ-fraction of the input (e.g., the game’s preferences) to make it have the property.
In particular, we consider verification of perfection, individual rationality, Nash sta-
bility, (contractual) individual stability, and core stability. Furthermore, we show
that while there is always a Nash-stable coalition (which also implies individually
stable coalitions), the existence of a perfect coalition can be tested. All our testers
have one-sided error and time complexity that is independent of the input size.
∗This author acknowledges the support by ERC grant No. 307696.
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1 Introduction
Hedonic games are a form of coalition formation games, in which players form teams in a
decentralized manner based on individual preferences over coalitions, i.e., subsets of players.
The solution to such a game is a coalition structure, i.e., a partition of the set of players. The main
idea of hedonic games is that the players’ evaluation of a coalition structure only depends on their
own coalitions and not on how other players work together Dre`ze and Greenberg (1980). These
games have been formalized by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002),
independently. In order to evaluate the quality of a coalition structure, several solution concepts
have been considered. These include, e.g., Nash stability, which states that no individual player
wants to deviate from the coalition structure, and core stability, which requires that no group of
players wants to peel off and form a coalition of their own.
Algorithmically, a key issue is to find suitable representations of hedonic games: Since the
number of possible coalitions for a player is exponential in the number of players, there is a
trade-off between compactness and expressivity of the preference profile. In the areas of Coop-
erative Games in Multiagent Systems (see, e.g., (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011)) and Computational
Social Choice (see, e.g., (Aziz and Savani, 2016)), a number of representations and stability
concepts are analysed with respect to the computational complexity of deciding whether there
exists a stable solution, verifying whether a given solution is stable, and finding a stable solu-
tion. Even for restricted representations such as additively separable games, these questions are
often intractable. For instance, it is often NP-complete to decide whether a given game allows
a Nash-stable coalition structure, see e.g., Peters (2016). The existence of core-stability is often
even Σp2-complete to decide, see e.g., Woeginger (2013) and Ota et al. (2017). This strikes even
harder when the considered game instances are very large because they arise from, e.g., social
networks or the assignment of advertisements to available slots on web pages such that adjacent
ads do not interfere. Here, it might already be impractical to read the whole input once because
the data does not fit into memory or the access is slow or restricted.
In this paper, we study sublinear algorithms for hedonic games. We aim to decide in sublinear
time whether a game has a stable coalition structure or is far from this with respect to the number
of required changes of preferences such that it admits one, as well as whether a game is stable
under a given coalition structure Γ or is far from being stable under Γ. When a coalition can
be stabilized by only few compromises on the preferences, it may be acceptable to sustain the
situation or (if possible) make the changes. When, however, too many modifications are required
to obtain any stable situation, the current situation is too far off the goal.
Graph representations provide a compact means to encode structural connections between
players. A formal study of graphical hedonic games is provided by Peters (2016). A popular
variant is to encode a game as a network where players correspond to vertices and edges illustrate
friendship relations. Players that are no friends are often referred to as enemies. Preferences
are extended either by prioritising appreciation of friends or aversion to enemies Dimitrov et al.
(2006). However, if the game is very large, many players may not be involved in any relationship.
In this scenario, it is natural to consider a more general model. For each player, the set of other
players is divided into three subsets: friends, enemies and neutral players Ota et al. (2017), which
is what we call the FEN-encoding. Furthermore, we bound the number of friends and enemies
per player by a constant (for example, if the players are humans, this phenomenon is known as
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Dunbar’s number Dunbar (1992), which describes the maximum number of stable relationships
a single person can maintain). Under restrictions such as bounded degree and bounded treewidth,
some stability questions become solvable in linear time Peters (2016). Nevertheless, this still
incurs the evaluation of the whole game in order to verify whether a coalition structure is stable.
Given the local views of individual vertices within hedonic games, it would be preferable and
much more practical to ask only a sample of players for their individual preferences and deduce
global properties.
The area of property testing provides a framework to relax such decision problems in favour
of sublinear complexity (see, e.g., (Goldreich, 2017) for an overview). A property tester is a
randomized algorithm that decides, with error probability at most 1/3, whether the input satisfies
some property P or is far from satisfying P by probing only a small part of it. In the setting
of graph properties, a graph G = (V,E) with bounded vertex degree d is ǫ-far from satisfying
some property P (e.g., bipartiteness) if one has to modify at least ǫdn edges to make G have
property P. If the property tester always accepts graphs in P, it has one-sided error; otherwise,
it has two-sided error. The input graph G may be probed by the algorithm through an oracle that
provides access to the entries of the adjacency lists of G, and the computational complexity of
the property tester is measured in terms of queries it asks.
In comparison to classic decision problems, property testing problems allow for algorithms
with sublinear complexity. For example, a randomized decision algorithm for graph connectivity
needs to read the whole input to achieve constant error probability, which implies a linear lower
bound on the complexity. In contrast, a property tester for connectivity has only constant com-
plexity Goldreich and Ron (2002). This difference arises because the property tester does not
need to read the whole input, and, in fact, sublinear complexity renders this impossible. There-
fore, the input model plays an important role in property testing. While there is a characterization
for constant query testable properties in dense graphs (graphs with Ω(|V |2) edges) Alon et al.
(2009), less is known for graphs with bounded degree and general graphs.
1.1 Our Contribution
We study property testing of stability problems in FEN-hedonic games, where each player has
a bounded number of symmetric relationships to friends and enemies as represented by labelled
edges of an undirected graph, and preferences are extended to coalitions by any utility function
linear in the number of friends and enemies in a coalition. The setting of hedonic games enhances
graphs by rich semantics, which stands in contrast to purely combinatorial and geometric prop-
erties previously studied in graph property testing. We model the semantics of hedonic games as
an additional layer on top of the combinatorial graph structure and analyze existence and verifi-
cation problems for various stability concepts. In particular, we study common individual-based
stability concepts such as perfection, individual rationality, Nash stability, and (contractual) in-
dividual stability as well as core stability.
While individually rational, Nash-stable, individually stable, and contractually individually
stable coalitions always exist, there are games which do not allow a perfect coalition structure.
Theorem 1. Given a FEN-hedonic game G with bounded degree d, it can be tested whether G
admits a perfect coalition structure with bounded coalition size c with one-sided error and query
complexity poly(ǫ, c, d).
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While the existence problem as to whether a game allows a stable outcome is a property of
edge-labelled graphs, the verification problem of whether a game satisfies stability according to
a fixed coalition structure Γ requires additional modelling: We assume that next to oracle access
to the adjacency lists of the underlying bounded-degree graph of a game G, we have additional
access to an oracle to Γ, i.e., a partition of the vertex set.
We show the testability of verification problems independent of any bound on the coalition
size.
Theorem 2. Given a FEN-hedonic gameG with bounded degree d and a coalition structure Γ, it
can be tested whether G is stable under Γ with respect to perfection, individual rationality, Nash
stability, individual stability and contractual individual stability with one-sided error and query
complexity poly(ǫ, d). For core stability we obtain a tester with query complexity poly(ǫ, c, d),
where c is the maximum coalition size.
Note that while we consider c and d to be of constant size, independent of the input size n,
our statements remain valid if, for instance, d ∈ O(log n).
1.2 Related Work
Hedonic games were formally defined by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002). A well-known application of a restricted variant with size-two coalitions is the stable-
roommates problem Cechla´rova´ (2002) for the allocation of student houses. Mostly, hedonic
games have been analysed from a computational complexity point of view with respect to a
trade-off between expressivity, succinct representation and tractability of stability decision prob-
lems. The complexity of general hedonic games has first been studied by Ballester (2004). The
worst-case complexity of stability problems for various representations and different stability
concepts has been studied extensively: Popular representations include additively separable he-
donic games Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002); Aziz et al. (2013); Woeginger (2013), singleton
encodings Cechla´rova´ and Romero-Medina (2001), hedonic coalition nets Elkind and Wooldridge
(2009), and dichotomous preferences Aziz et al. (2016); see also Aziz and Savani (2016) and Chalkiadakis et al.
(2011) for an overview. Peters and Elkind (2015) analyse causes of and conditions for hard-
ness. The existence of Nash stability and other individual stability concepts is often (if not
guaranteed) NP-complete to decide. For core stability, this is often even harder, namely Σp2-
complete Woeginger (2013); Ota et al. (2017). Dimitrov et al. (2006) define restricted hedonic
games based on a network of friends and enemies. A more general version including neutral
players is defined by Ota et al. (2017). Games with neutral players and partial individual eval-
uations are studied by Lang et al. (2015) and Peters (2016). Peters, in particular, considers a
constant bound on the number individual preferences and studies graphical hedonic games with
bounded treewidth. With this restriction, it can be decided in linear time whether, for instance, a
Nash stability coalition structure exists. A graphical model restricting the formation of feasible
coalitions is studied by Igarashi and Elkind (2016).
Goldreich and Ron (2002) showed that classic graph problems like connectivity, being Eu-
lerian and cycle freeness are testable with constant query complexity. On the other hand, it is
known that testing bipartiteness Goldreich and Ron (1999) and expansion Czumaj and Sohler
(2010); Kale and Seshadhri (2011); Nachmias and Shapira (2010) have upper and lower bounds
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of roughly Θ(
√
n). Turning to more general results, Benjamini et al. (2010) proved that every
minor-closed property is constant query testable, and Newman and Sohler (2013) extended this
result to hold for every hyperfinite property. Property testing of annotated (or labelled) graphs has
been studied for geometric graphs mainly. For example, testing whether a graph that is embedded
into the plane is a Euclidean minimum spanning tree has been studied by Ben-Zwi et al. (2007)
and Czumaj and Sohler (2008). Ben-Zwi et al. show that any non-adaptive tester has to make
Ω(
√
n) queries, and that any adaptive tester has query complexity Ω(n1/3). Czumaj and Sohler
provide a one-sided error tester with query complexity O˜(
√
n/ǫ). Hellweg et al. (2010) develop
a tester for Euclidean (1 + δ)-spanners.
Learning hedonic games was studied by Sliwinski and Zick (2017). While property testing
focuses on testing whether a game admits a stable outcome or whether an outcome is stable with
sublinear complexity, PAC learning constructs a good hypothesis and PAC stabilization uses
this hypothesis to learn a stable outcome (if possible) using a superlinear number of samples
(with possibly linear size). As far as we know, no sublinear algorithms have been developed for
hedonic games, yet.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider undirected graphs with vertex degrees bounded by a constant d. For
a graph G = (V,E) at hand, we write n = |V |. Without loss of generality, we assume that
V = [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
2.1 Hedonic Games
A hedonic game (N,) consists of a set of players N = [n] and a preference profile = (1
, . . . ,n), where i is player i’s preference relation over Ni = {C ⊆ N | i ∈ C}. A subset
C ⊆ N of players is called coalition. An output of a hedonic game is a coalition structure, i.e.,
a partition Γ of the player set. Let Γ(i) ∈ Γ be the coalition containing i ∈ N . We say that
a player i weakly prefers a coalition A to a coalition B, if A i B. Player i prefers A to B,
denoted by A ≻i B, if A i B, but B 6i A; i is indifferent between A and B, denoted by
A ∼i B, if A i B and B i A.
Since the set Ni of coalitions a player is contained in, has an exponential size in the number
of players, a central question in the study of hedonic games is to define representations that are
adequately compact and at the same time as expressive as possible.
One common representation is that of a graph network G = (N,E), where the players are
vertices in the graph. In the encoding as defined by Ota et al. (2017), for each player i ∈ N , there
exists a set N+i ⊆ N \ {i} of friends, set N−i \ {i} of enemies, N+i ∩N−i = ∅. The remaining
players are considered as neutral N0i = N \ (N+i ∪ N−i ∪ {i}). We call this representation
FEN-encoding. It can be represented by a labelled graph G = (N,F ∪ E) with F ∩ E = ∅,
where j ∈ N+i if and only if (i, j) ∈ F , and j ∈ N−i if and only if (i, j) ∈ E. This conforms
to the definition of a graphical hedonic game Peters (2016) such that a player i’s preference of a
coalition C ∈ Ni over a coalition D ∈ Ni only depends on i’s neighbourhood Ni = N+i ∪N−i :
C i D ⇐⇒ C ∩Ni i D ∩Ni. (1)
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Here, we extend the players’ relations to preferences in the following manner. A value function
is specified such that each player i ∈ N assigns a positive value f ∈ R to each j ∈ N+i and
a negative value −e ∈ R to each j ∈ N−i . The corresponding utility function ui : Ni → R,
i ∈ N , is defined additively by ui(C) = f · |C ∩N+i |−e · |C ∩N−i |. For instance, under friends
appreciation we have f = d and e = 1, and under enemies aversion this corresponds to f = 1
and e = d. The preference extension is obtained by A i B ⇐⇒ ui(A) ≥ ui(B).
Definition 3. We call a hedonic game represented by an FEN-encoding with a preference profile
extended via a utility function linear in the number of friends and enemies, FEN-hedonic game.
Note that responsiveness is always satisfied by the considered preference extensions, i.e.,
C ∪ {j} ≻i C and C ≻i C ∪ {j′}, for each i ∈ N , and each C ∈ Ni and j ∈ N+i , j′ ∈ N−i .
Since we consider undirected graphs, we obtain symmetric preferences, i.e., i ∈ N+j if and only
if j ∈ N+i and i ∈ N−j if and only if j ∈ N−i .
Furthermore, we make the following assumptions. We consider graphs of bounded degree
|Ni| ≤ d represented by an adjacency list; in particular, it can be decided in time independent
of the number n of players whether C i D, and independent of the coalition size |C| and |D|.
Moreover, it is often useful to restrict the coalition size, e.g., when players are people that have to
communicate or when a coalition represents all ads displayed on a single web page. Therefore,
we also consider a bounded coalition size of |C| ≤ c.
By Gn we denote the set of graphs with n vertices that represent such a game. The set of
coalition structures partitioning n players is denoted by Cn. For a stability concept, questions of
interest are:
• Verification: Given a game and a coalition structure, is it stable?
• Existence: Is a given game stable, i.e., does there exist a stable coalition structure?
• Search: Find a stable coalition structure for a given game.
In the following, let G = (N,F ∪E) be a graph that represents a FEN-hedonic game and let
Γ ∈ Cn be a coalition structure solving this game. There are several solutions concepts motivated
from different perspectives on the game.
On the one hand, Γ is called
perfect if each player i ∈ N weakly prefers Γ(i) to every coalition, i.e., Γ(i) i C for each
C ∈ Ni, |C| ≤ c.
This property reflects an ideal situation, but is rather rarely fulfilled. On the other hand, Γ is
called
individually rational if for each player i ∈ N , Γ(i) is acceptable, i.e., Γ(i) i {i}.
Individual rationality is guaranteed by {{i} | i ∈ N}.
Other stability notions are based, for example, on the lack of deviations of a single player to
another (possibly empty) existing coalition. Let Fav(i) denote the set of i’s favourite coalitions
of size at most c, i.e., those coalitions that i weakly prefers over all other coalitions of size at
most c. A coalition structure Γ is called
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Nash-stable if no player wants to move to another existing or empty coalition, i.e., for each
player i ∈ N and each coalition C ∈ Γ∪ {∅} with |C| < c, it holds that Γ(i) i C ∪ {i};
individually stable if no player can move to another preferred coalition without making a player
in the new coalition worse off, i.e., for each player i ∈ N and for each coalition C ∈
Γ ∪ {∅} with |C| < c, it holds that Γ(i) i C ∪ {i} or there exists a player j ∈ C such
that C ≻j C ∪ {i};
contractually individually stable if no player can move to another preferred coalition without
making a player in the new coalition or in the old coalition worse off, i.e., for each
player i ∈ N and for each coalition C ∈ Γ ∪ {∅} with |C| < c, it holds that Γ(i) i
C ∪ {i}, or there exists a player j ∈ C such that C ≻j C ∪ {i}, or there exists a player
j′ ∈ Γ(i) \ {i} such that Γ(i) ≻j′ Γ(i) \ {i}.
Note that Nash stability implies individual stability, which, in turn, implies contractual individual
stability. A further popular stability concept is based on group deviation. A coalition structure Γ
is called
core stable if no coalition blocks Γ, i.e., for each non-empty coalition C ⊆ N , there exists a
player i ∈ C such that Γ(i) i C .
2.2 Graph Property Testing
Let G = (V,E) be a graph with vertex degrees bounded by d and let P be a graph property, i.e.,
a set of graphs (e.g., let P be all graphs that admit a perfect coalition structure). We say that G
is ǫ-far from a property P if more than ǫdn edges of G have to be modified in order to convert
it into a graph that satisfies the property P, otherwise G is ǫ-close to P. A property tester has
access to G by querying a function fG : V × [n] → [n] ∪ {⋆}, where fG(v, i) denotes the ith
neighbour of v if v has at least i neighbours. Otherwise, fG(v, i) = ⋆.
Definition 4 (One-sided testers). A one-sided error ǫ-tester for a property P of bounded degree
graphs with query complexity q is a randomized algorithm A that makes q queries to fG for a
graph G. The algorithm A accepts if G has the property P. If G is ǫ-far from P, then A rejects
with probability at least 2/3.
A graph property P is edge monotone if for everyG = (V,E) ∈ P, {(V,E′) | E′ ⊆ E} ⊆ P.
In other words, every subgraph of G is also in P.
3 Property Testing of Stability Concepts
To test stability concepts, we generalize the standard edit distance of graph property testing as
follows. Since we consider graphs G = (V, F ∪E) that represent FEN-hedonic games, we have
to account for the two types of edges: friends and enemies. Therefore, an edge modification
is one insertion of an element to or one removal of an element from F ∪ E, respectively, while
maintaining F ∩E = ∅. In particular, turning a friend edge into an enemy edge is counted as two
edge modifications (removing it from F and inserting it into E). The intuition of these semantics
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is that edge modifications measure the number of compromises that are needed to reach a stable
situation. If a partition is too far from being stable, too many compromises are necessary, and
the partition should be discarded. Everything in-between is not an ideal situation, but only a few
compromises may be affordable.
Now, the existence of a stable outcome in a game is modelled as a graph property as follows.
Definition 5 (stability existence property). The set of stable graphs with respect to some stability
concept (e.g., Nash stability) is the set of all graphs G that admit a stable coalition structure.
For some stability concepts, the existence of a stable outcome is guaranteed. Nevertheless, the
question of whether a given partition Γ satisfies the stability property can still be hard to decide.
The worst case time that is needed to verify stability of Γ for all stability concepts mentioned
above is at least linear in the number of players. We can, however, tackle the following problem
in sublinear time: Given a graph G and a partition of vertices Γ, is Γ a stable outcome for the
game represented by G, or is G ǫ-far from being a stable instance for Γ?
Definition 6 (Γ-stability verification property). Let n ∈ N, and let Γ be a partition of [n]. The
set of Γ-stable graphs with respect to some stability concept (e.g., Nash stability) is the set of
n-vertex graphs G such that Γ is a stable coalition structure of G.
Note that, unlike the existence of a stable coalition structure, a stability property is not closed
under isomorphism as long as Γ is not permuted additionally. Therefore, extending the basic
model of graph property testing to reflect the semantics of hedonic games is the foundation of
our main contribution. Access to Γ is provided by a set oracle that supports two queries. A find
query returns, given a vertex v, the key of the set that contains v. A member query returns, given
a key k and an index i, the i-th element of the set represented by k, or ⋆ if no such element exists.
One beneficial feature of bounded degree graphs is the bounded size of neighbourhoods, i.e.,
the number of graphs that have constant distance to a given vertex. In hedonic games, this is
mirrored by the maximum coalition size, and therefore, we take the coalition size as a parameter
into our analysis.
4 Property Testing in the FEN-Model
In this section we study property testers for stability verification problems, resulting in Theo-
rem 2, as well as stability existence problems, resulting in Theorem 1, for various individual-
based stability notions within the previously defined model of FEN-hedonic games.
4.1 Testing Verification Problems
In the following we aim to prove Theorem 2, the testability of verification problems with query
complexity dependent only on the degree bound, but independent of the graph size or any coali-
tion bound, which is restated in Theorem 12 below. In our constructions we relate to the players’
favourite coalitions and make use of the following lemma that states that we can easily modify a
player’s local surroundings to turn the current coalition into a favourite coalition. In other words,
only a constant number of compromises suffice to optimise one player’s current situation.
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Lemma 7. For every graph G = (N,F ∪ E) with |F ∪ E| bounded by d, each coalition
structure Γ of N , it holds that for each i ∈ N , O(d) queries and d edge modifications are
sufficient to turn Γ(i) into one of i’s favourite coalitions in the FEN-hedonic game represented
by G.
Proof. If for player i, it already holds that Γ(i) ∈ Fav(i), no modification is required. Otherwise
we can proceed as follows: Accessing the (at most d) members of Ni requires at most d oracle
queries. Moreover, we can ask one oracle query each in order to find out, whether a player j ∈
Ni = N
+
i ∪ N−i is contained in Γ(i). For each j ∈ Γ(i) ∩ N−i , delete the edge (i, j) from E;
for each j ∈ N+i \ Γ(i): remove the edge (i, j) from F . This requires at most |N+i | + |N−i | ≤
d edge modifications. Note that this is independent of any bound c of the coalition size. The
obtained coalition now only contains friends of i’s and i does not have any friends outside of
Γ(i). Hence, for all considered preference extensions, no coalition is preferred to the current
coalition Γ(i).
Many stability concepts are of the form such that stability holds if and only if no player i
satisfies a certain condition φ(i). If there exists a player j that satisfies this condition φ(j), we
call j a witness for non-stability.
Next, we observe that due to responsiveness and symmetry in all considered preference ex-
tensions, an edge modification that benefits one player, can never be a disadvantage for other
players.
Observation 8. Let i, j ∈ N be two players in the FEN-hedonic game represented by a graphG =
(N,F ∪E). Furthermore, let i be i’s original preference relation, and ′i the preference rela-
tion of i after a modification of edge (i, j), i.e., in the new game represented byG′ = (N,F ′∪E′)
with the same preference extension. The following statements hold:
1. If (i, j) is deleted from E, for each C ∈ Ni, j /∈ C , it holds that C ≻i C ∪ {j} and
C ∪ {j} ∼′i C ,
2. If (i, j) is deleted from F , for each C ∈ Ni, j /∈ C , it holds that C ∪ {j} ≻i C and
C ∪ {j} ∼′i C ,
3. If (i, j) is deleted from E, and C ≻i D for two coalitions C,D ∈ Ni with j ∈ C , it holds
that C ≻′i D.
4. If (i, j) is deleted from F , and C ≻i D for two coalitions C,D ∈ Ni with j /∈ C , it holds
that C ≻′i D.
The considered stability concepts are defined via properties that need to be avoided for each
player. Let φ denote such a player property assigning each player i either value 1 (i is a witness
against the property) or value 0 (i is not a witness). In the following proofs we require certain
conditions to hold for φ and show that all considered concepts share these conditions, which
enables us to devise a unified testing scheme.
Definition 9. Let γ be a stability concept for which there exists a property φ : Gn × Cn →
{0, 1}n, n ∈ N, such that for any game represented by G = (N,F ∪ E), |N | = n and a
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coalition structure Γ ∈ Cn it holds that φi(G,Γ) = 0 for each i ∈ N , if and only if Γ is
stable in G with respect to γ. We say that φ is feasible in our setting if for each n and each
G = (N,F ∪ E) ∈ Gn and Γ ∈ Cn the following conditions are met for each i ∈ N .
(i) Γ(i) ∈ Fav(i) =⇒ φi(G,Γ) = 0.
(ii) The value φi(G,Γ) can be determined with a constant number of queries to the oracles
for G and Γ (i.e., dependent on d, but independent of n).
(iii) If φi(G,Γ) = 0 and an edge (j, i), j /∈ Γ(i) is removed from F , resulting in a new game
G′, it holds that φi(G
′,Γ) = 0 remains valid.
(iv) If φi(G,Γ) = 0 and an edge (j, i), j ∈ Γ(i) is removed from E, resulting in a new game
G′, it holds that φi(G
′,Γ) = 0 remains valid.
We note that if φ is feasible, then φ is edge monotone.
Lemma 10. Let G = (N,F ∪ E) be a graph that represents a FEN-hedonic game and Γ a
coalition structure of N . Let, furthermore, γ be a stability concept, for which there exists a
feasible player property φ. If there are at most k witnesses, k ·d edge modifications are sufficient
to make the game stable with respect to γ.
Proof. By Lemma 7, for each witness i, d edge modifications are enough to turn Γ(i) into a
favourite coalition, thus, φ(i) = 1 is no longer satisfied. For each player j that is not a witness,
φ(j) = 0 already holds which does not change due to Conditions (iii) and (iv) of Definition 9. If
there are at most k witnesses, k · d edge modifications are sufficient such that no player satisfies
φ(i), thus, stability with respect to γ holds.
With the help of this lemma we are now ready to prove that Algorithm 1 provides a property
tester for the verification problem of each stability concept with a feasible player property.
Algorithm 1
Require: access to G = (N,F ∪E) and Γ is provided by an oracle, φ(G,Γ) is the correspond-
ing boolean stability function
1: function VERIFICATIONTESTER(N , F , E, s)
2: s← 1ǫ ln 3
3: sample s players iid from N
4: for each sampled player i do
5: if φi(G,Γ) = 1 then
6: return reject
7: return accept
Theorem 11. Let γ be a stability concept for which there exists a feasible player property φ.
It holds that Algorithm 1 is a one-sided error property tester for Γ-stability verification with
respect to γ.
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Proof. If γ holds, there is no witness for non-stability, i.e., for each sampled vertex φ(i) = 0
holds. Therefore, the tester decides in Line 6 that γ holds with probability 1.
If Γ is ǫ-far from being stable with respect to γ, at least ǫdn edge modifications are required.
Thus, by Lemma 10, there are at least ǫdn/d = ǫn witnesses. Hence, the probability that a sam-
pled player is a witness is at least ǫn · 1/n = ǫ.
Then, the algorithm correctly rejects if at least one witness is sampled, i.e., the condition in
Line 5 is true. The probability of this event is 1 minus the probability that for each sampled
player the condition in Line 5 is false, i.e., φi(G,Γ) = 0. The latter probability is at most
(1− ǫ)s ≤ e−(ǫ·s) = e− ln 3 = 1
3
.
Thus, the probability that the tester correctly rejects is at least 2/3.
Since φ is feasible, φi(G,Γ) can be determined in constant query time. Hence, the tester
requires constant query time dependent on the applied function φ.
Now it remains to show that each considered stability property has such a feasible player prop-
erty φ. By Theorem 11, we obtain a verification tester by Algorithm 1 with a query complexity
depending on φ.
Theorem 12. For the FEN-hedonic game model, the Γ-stability verification property can be
tested with respect to
1. perfection and individual rationality with query complexity in O(d/ǫ),
2. Nash stability, individual and contractual individual stability with query complexity in
O(d/ǫ).
3. core stability with query complexity O(c2 ·dc2 ·ec), where c is the maximum coalition size.
Proof. For each considered stability concept we show that there exists a feasible player property
such that Theorem 11 can be applied. In each case we determine the query complexity of the
tester.
perfect: The corresponding player property is
φi(G,Γ) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃C ∈ Ni : C ≻i Γ(i).
This is the case if and only if Γ(i) does not contain all of i’s friends and none of i’s
enemies, which can be verified in constant query time by asking whether j is in the same
coalition as i for each j ∈ Ni. Therefore, condition (ii) is met with d queries per sampled
player. In total, the query complexity is in O(d/ǫ). Condition (i) holds by definition of
perfection. Conditions (iii) and (iv) can be implied immediately by Observation 8, since
the relation Γ(i) i C remains valid in each relevant case.
individually rational: Here, the player property is
φi(G,Γ) = 1 ⇐⇒ {i} ≻i Γ(i).
Condition (i) holds, since C ∈ Fav(i) implies that C i {i}. Since the decision whether
{i} ≻i Γ(i) only depends on |Γ(i) ∩ Ni|, d queries are sufficient, i.e., a total query
complexity in O(d/ǫ). Again, Conditions (iii) and (iv) can be implied by Observation 8.
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Nash-stable: A witness i against Nash stability satisfies
φi(G,Γ) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃C ∈ Γ ∪ {∅} : C ∪ {i} ≻i Γ(i)
Condition (i) holds, since Γ(i) ∈ Fav(i) implies Γ(i) i C in particular for C such that
C = C ′ ∪ {i}, C ′ ∈ Γ ∪ {∅}.
(a) If Γ(i) ∩ N+i 6= ∅, i wants to deviate to a coalition C with ui(C ∪ {i}) > ui(Γ(i)).
Due to the linearity of the preferences, this can only be {i} (with ui({i}) = 0) or a
coalition in Γ that contains at least one friend. There are at most |N+i | ≤ d coalitions
in Γ that contain a friend, namely Γ(j), j ∈ N+i . Hence, at most d comparisons of
coalitions are sufficient, which can be done with at most d neighbour and d find
queries by Equation (1).
(b) If Γ(i) ∩N+i = ∅, but N+i 6= ∅, the analysis is analogous to (a).
(c) If N+i = ∅ and Γ(i) ∩N−i = ∅, Γ(i) is already one of i’s favourite coalitions, hence
φi(G,Γ) = 0.
(d) If N+i = ∅ and Γ(i) ∩N−i 6= ∅, i wants to deviate to the single player coalition {i},
hence φi(G,Γ) = 1.
It can be decided with d neighbour queries which of the four cases holds for Γ(i). The
at most d coalition comparisons require at most d additional find queries. Therefore,
φi(G,Γ) can be decided with O(d) queries, satisfying Condition (ii). The total query
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(d/ǫ).
Again, Conditions (iii) and (iv) can be implied by Observation 8.
individually stable: A witness i against individual stability satisfies
φi(G,Γ) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃C ∈ Γ ∪ {∅} : C ∪ {i} ≻i Γ(i) and
∀j ∈ C : C ∪ {i} j C.
Hence, if i is not a witness for a Nash deviation, it cannot be a witness here, either. There-
fore, Condition (i) holds. If i wants to deviate, this is due to one of the cases (a), (b), or (d)
above. In the latter case, again, Γ(i) is not acceptable, and i is always welcome in {i}. In
cases (a) and (b), we have to consider at most |N+i | candidate coalitions, i can deviate to.
For each neutral player j ∈ N0i , it holds that Γ(j) ∼j Γ(j) ∪ {i}. Thus, we only have to
ask i’s neighbours for permission to enter the new coalition, which are in total at most d. In
fact, due to the symmetry of preferences, friends always welcome i, and enemies always
don’t.
We obtain φi(G,Γ) = 0 if and only if there are no enemies in C , which we can decide
with at most d queries. Thus, we can employ the same queries as for Nash stability in
order to determine φi(G,Γ), which satisfies Condition (ii). The total query complexity of
Algorithm 1 is O(d/ǫ).
Observe that if i is not a witness due to some C ⊆ Γ ∪ {∅} and a player j ∈ C with
C ≻j C ∪ {i}, j is i’s enemy due to Observation 8. That means, if an edge (k, i) is
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deleted from F , the witness condition is unchanged. Thus, Condition (iii) is met. If an
edge (k, i) is deleted from E and k ∈ Γ(i), Condition (iv) can only be false if k = j. In
that case Γ(i) = Γ(k) = Γ(j) = C holds, a contradiction to C ≻j C ∪ {i}. If i is not
a witness, because there does not exist any preferred coalition to move to, the arguments
for Nash stability can be applied.
contractually individually stable: A witness i against contractual individual stability satisfies
φi(G,Γ) = 1 which holds if and only if there exists some C ∈ Γ ∪ {∅} such that the two
conditions for individual stability (C ∪ {i} ≻i Γ(i) and ∀j ∈ C : C ∪ {i} j C) and
an additional condition (∀j′ ∈ Γ(i) \ {i} : Γ(i) \ {i} j′ Γ(i)) hold. Condition (i) holds
analogously to individual stability.
Observe that for neutral players j′ ∈ N0i ∩Γ(i) it holds that Γ(i) ∼j′ Γ(i)\{i} and for en-
emies j′ ∈ N−i it holds that Γ(i)\{i} ≻j′ Γ(i). Again, if i wants to deviate to a coalition,
cases (a), (b) and (d) remain. In case (a) i has friends in Γ(i) that i contractually depends
on. Here φi(G,Γ) = 0. In cases (b) and (d) there are no friends in Γ(i), which means there
is no contractual dependence. Then, i is a witness against contractual individual stability
if and only if it is a witness against individual stability. Thus, in case (d) φi(G,Γ) = 1 and
in case (b) that same queries as above can be applied. Thus, we need at mostO(d) queries
in order to determine φi(G,Γ). The total query complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(d/ǫ).
Conditions (iii) and (iv) hold with analogous arguments as above.
core-stable: A player i is a witness against core-stability if i takes part in a blocking coalition,
i.e., i ∈ C such that each j ∈ C prefers C to Γ(j). Observe that if there exists a coalition
blocking Γ, its connected components also block Γ. Hence, we can assume that C is con-
nected. It either holds that Γ(i) is not acceptable for i, and C = {i} or C is a neighbouring
coalition to i.
Condition (i) holds, since i cannot strictly prefer a blocking coalition to a favourite coali-
tion.
Now, in order to detect a connected blocking coalition C that contains i, we have to query
the oracle as follows: We verify whether Γ(i) is acceptable for i by considering the inter-
section of i’s neighbours Ni with Γ(i). If it is not acceptable, C = {i} holds, and thus,
φi(G,Γ) = 1. If Γ(i) is acceptable, C can only be any of i’s neighbouring coalitions, that
are connected and of size |C| ≤ c. There are at most
c∑
k=1
(
dc
k
)
≤
c∑
k=1
(
dc · e
k
)k
≤ cd˙c2 · ec
possible such coalitions. If for each of these coalitions C , we ask the at most c contained
players j ∈ C whether they prefer C to Γ(j), this is sufficient to verify whether one of the
coalitions blocks Γ and, thus, whether i is a witness. Therefore, Condition (ii) holds.
Now, let φi(G,Γ) = 0, i.e., for each neighbouring coalition C to i, there exists some
j ∈ C such that Γ(j) j C . Condition (iii) holds by the following argument. Assume,
an edge (i, k) is removed from E, k ∈ Γ(i). Then, it holds that: If k 6= j and i 6= j,
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φi(G,Γ) = 0 remains valid. If i = j, Γ(i) i C implies that Γ(i) ′i C by Observation 8.
If k = j and i 6= j, Γ(k) k C implies that Γ(k) ′k C by Observation 8. Similarly,
Condition (iv) is obtained by Observation 8.
4.2 Testing Existence Problems
Now we prove Theorem 1. In general, there always exists an individually rational coalition
structure. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) show that in symmetric additively separable hedonic
games there always exists a Nash stable coalition structure. Note that in our model the argument
that if a player deviates, the social welfare increases, remains valid, even for bounded coalition
size.
Observation 13. Each symmetric FEN-hedonic game (all considered preference extensions)
allows a Nash-stable, and consequently individually stable and contractually individually stable
coalition structure.
There does not necessarily exist a perfect coalition structure. For example, there does not
exist any perfect coalition structure for G = ({1, 2, 3}, F ∪ E), where F = ((1, 2), (2, 3)),
E = (3, 1).
Theorem 14. There is a tester with constant query complexity for the existence of a perfect
coalition structure in the FEN-hedonic game model with a constant coalition size bound.
Proof. Let v ∈ V , and observe that C is a favourite coalition of v if and only ifC∩F (v) = F (v)
and C ∩ E(v) = ∅. It follows that there exists a perfect coalition structure Γ if and only if there
does not exist any edge in E between vertices of the same connected component of G[VF ],
where VF is the set of endpoints in F , i.e., VF = {u | (u, v) ∈ F}. This suggests the following
algorithm: first, sample a set S of |S| = 1/ǫ ln 3 vertices at random. For each v ∈ V , we run a
BFS that follows only edges in F . If one of these BFSs sees more than c vertices or it discovers
two endpoints u, v of the same edge (u, v) ∈ E, the tester rejects. Otherwise it accepts the graph.
By the above observation, every path in G that contains only edges from F must be in the
same coalition in a perfect coalition structure. The algorithm rejects only when it finds a path
P such that for every coalition structure Γ such that some coalition C ∈ Γ contains P , C also
contains (u, v) ∈ E, which is a witness against the existence of a perfect coalition structure.
If G is ǫ-far from having a perfect coalition structure, then at least ǫdn edges in F ∪ E have
to be removed in order to make G have a perfect coalition structure because having a perfect
coalition structure is an edge-monotone property. Let R be a minimal set of edges that have to
be removed. Since (
1− ǫdn
nd
) 1
ǫ
ln 3
≤ 1
3
,
S contains a vertex u that is incident to an edge (u, v) ∈ R with probability at least 2/3. As
argued above, then the tester finds (u, v) and rejects.
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5 Open Questions
A natural question that is related to finding stable partitions is the following: Given a graph
G and a partition Γ, is the partition Γ far from being stable in G (instead of the graph being
far from Γ-stable)? This can be generalized further: Property testing is a special case of local
computation algorithms (LCA), where one shall provide oracle access to a solution, given oracle
access to the input. In property testing, the solution is a single bit (accept or reject). While it is
beyond the scope of sublinear algorithms to actually compute a stable partition, one may seek to
develop an LCA that gives oracle access to it.
Generalizing the results we obtained, one may seek to obtain sublinear algorithms for games
with unbounded coalition size. Here, the main difficulty is to obtain insights into the local struc-
ture of very large, say, linear sized coalitions.
Following a slightly different line of thought, one may consider other graphs models like the
dense model, where (almost) all players relate to each other and one may ask how two players
i, j relate, or the general graph model, where vertices have arbitrary degrees.
As mentioned in the introduction, there exist also plenty of other stability concepts like Pareto-
optimality and popularity that can operate on the same preference extension, which may be inter-
esting to analyse in order to obtain a deeper understanding of locality mechanics in FEN-hedonic
games. Here, the main difficulty is to circumvent the usually high computational complexity of
the exact decision problems.
Finally, one may study other models of hedonic games, in particular with ordinal preferences
(e.g., rankings over known edges Lang et al. (2015)). This requires further modelling of the
oracle access and considered distance measures.
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